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Interdependence:
An Alternative Conceptualization
BART VICTOR

University of Nebraska, Lincoln
RICHARD S. BLACKBURN

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Conceptualizations of interdependence offered by Thompson (1967)
and McCann and Ferry (1979) fail to satisfy basic requirements for
empirical or practical investigations of complex organizations. An
alternative conceptualization based on interdependence theory
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) is presented here
and used to explain the causes of interunit conflict and the effectiveness of coordination strategy. Hypotheses are presented, and future
research is proposed.

Units within organizations remain to a greater
enable one to (a) compare the effects of different
or lesser degree interdependent as a necessary
amounts of interdependence in organizations,
consequence of the division of labor. While the
determinants of the division of labor have been
extensively investigated, less attention has been

and (b) distinguish between interdependence
and other concomitant consequences of the division of labor. Neither of the constructs currently
offered in the literature meet these minimum

paid to the consequences of that division. In
particular, the effects of the interdependence between work units have not been adequately in-

criteria.

vestigated (Jones, 1984; McCann & Galbraith,
Current Interdependence Constructs
1981). It is argued here that expanding our knowlThompson's Construct
edge of interdependence requires a more fully
developed interdependence construct. This paThompson (1967) identified three patterns of
per critiques the development and operationalwork flow that can exist between units, each repization of this construct and offers an alternative
based on interdependence theory (Kelley &

resenting a different intensity or degree of link-

Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).
Lewin (1951) described constructs as tools used
to solve problems. As a tool, the more developed the construct, the more effective it can be
in problem solving. Such development entails
first defining the basic conceptual elements of
constructs. By so defining constructs, related constructs can be distinguished and instances of the
same construct can be compared. In the case of
interunit interdependence this construct should

Pooled interdependence represents an absence of work flow between units. Each unit uses
independent inputs and makes independent contributions to the organization. Serial interdependence represents a unidirectional exchange pattern where each unit's inputs are the outputs
from another unit and similarly, each unit's outputs are another unit's inputs. Reciprocal interdependence represents a contingent pattem in
the work flow where each unit's inputs are its

age between units.
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While McCann and Ferry (1979) specified a

own outputs, recycled through other units. Thompson conceptualized interdependence as the ex-

less ambiguous metric in their work, they used

tent to which the relationship between work units

only work flow exchange to develop their con-

could be characterized by one of these types of

struct. They did not incorporate reciprocal inter-

interdependence.

dependence into their metric of interdependence.

McCann and Ferry's Construct

chasing unit for raw materials, a production unit

For example, in addition to depending on a puralso may need materials delivered at specific

The second interdependence construct is based
on an analysis of the transactions or exchanges

times during production. A failure to coordinate

between work units (McCann & Ferry, 1979).
McCann and Ferry conceptualized interdepend-

serious a problem for the production unit as a

shipping and receiving schedules might be as

ence in terms of the characteristics of the re-

failure to deliver the materials at all. However,

sources exchanged between work units. They
operationalized interdependence as an additive

measure of such interdependence based on con-

function of number of resources exchanged,
amount of each resource, frequency of transaction, amount of time before loss of resource has

sult, their construct cannot accurately represent

McCann and Ferry do not explicitly include a
tingent or reciprocal requirements. As a reamounts of interdependence.

an impact on the unit, and the value of the re-

An Alternative Construct

sources to the unit.

Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,

Limitations of the Current Constructs

1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) provides an alter-

Each of these approaches has been used in

native framework for conceptualizing interdependence. Constructs developed from this framework can differentiate explicitly between levels
of interdependence. Further, such constructs can

organization theory. (For reviews of the empiri-

cal research on interdependence, see Fry, 1982,
and McCann and Galbraith, 1981.) Nevertheless,
it can be argued that neither construct meets

permit precise distinctions between amounts of

Lewin's criteria. In particular, the constructs
preclude an empirical assessment of differing
amounts of interdependence.
For instance, while Thompson's construct suggests an operationalization of interdependence,
it is at best an ordinal scale. Thompson proposed
that the amount of interdependence in a pooled

interdependence and other concomitant consequences of the division of labor. With constructs

so derived, critical characteristics of the relations
between work units can be compared and contrasted.

Interdependence Theory

Interdependence theory has provided one of
the major theoretical frameworks for social psychology since its original formulation in 1959
(Allport, 1985). Since that time, interdependence
theory has been applied to the study of a wide
range of dyadic and intergroup phenomena including bargaining behavior (e.g., Kelley &
Stahelski, 1970; Pruitt, 1970), conflict resolution
(e.g., Deutsch, 1973), and the evolution of intergroup relationships (e. g., Insko et al., 1980, 1982).
Applying interdependence theory to the study of
organizational process was suggested by Weick

process is less than the amount of interdepen-

dence in a serial process. Further, both pooled
and serial processes signify less interdependence
than a reciprocal process, but how much more
or less interdependence characterizes the differences between the processes is not specified.
McCann and Galbraith (1981) challenged the utility of Thompson's construct by asking, "are three

pooled interdependencies greater or less than
one reciprocal interdependency?" (p. 64). This

ambiguity in Thompson's development limits the
effectiveness of his construct as a tool for solving
problems in organizations.

(1979).
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Interdependence theory proposes that the rela-

manager. Such outcome levels are an opera-

tionship between one work unit and another

tionalization of the complex factors affecting the

work unit(s) can be described in terms of three
requirements for action: requirements for one's
own actions, requirements for the actions of

subjective utility of any alternative. Factors such

others, cind requirements for joint action as dic-

cal, strategic, and personal motivations (Jones,
1984; McClintock, 1972) may be incorporated in

as goals (Bowen & Jones, 1986), exchange and
coordination costs (Williamson, 1975), and politi-

tated by the technological, environmental, organizational, and interpersonal determinants of
work flow specified by the division and assign-

an assessment. How closely these outcomes cor-

respond to the objective utility of such alterna-

ment of labor. From these types of requirements

tives (Ford, 1979; Fry, 1982) remains an empiri-

for action, a construct of interunit interdepen-

cal question.

dence can be developed.

The work flow requirements of interdependent
units can be represented through an interde-

Framework for the Construct

pendence matrix (see Figure 1). Each manager

The three requirements give interdependent

(A, B) has two possible actions (a 1, a2, b 1, b2)

units a specified degree of absolute and/or con-

that would affect the performance of Unit A and

tingent control over their own and each other's

the performance of Unit B. Although this theory

performance. To the extent that Unit A requires

permits explicit consideration of coalitions and

an action by Unit B (e.g., delivery of materials,

other characteristics of multiple group behavior

completion of a task), B can affect A's operations

(e.g., Insko et al., 1982), only dyadic relation-

by either performing the required action or not.

ships are described here. Interdependence the-

In this situation of simple exchange, interdepen-

ory proposes that most of the fundamental pro-

dence theory asserts that B has fate control (FC)

cesses of interdependence do not change as the

over A.

number of interdependent parties or discrete actions are increased. Thus, the basic character-

If A requires an action by B, contingent on A's
own action (e.g., delivery of materials accord-

istics of interdependence can be represented in

ing to a production schedule, synchronized joint

a relationship between two persons, each having

use of a machine), B again can affect A's perfor-

two alternaTtives.

mance by matching or not matching A's contin-

In Figure 1, the rows and columns of the ma-

gent response. Interdependence theory asserts

trix correspond to the actions of two units, A and

thcat B has behavior control (BC) over A, because
when B varies a behavior (action), it becomes
preferable for A to vary a behavior.

Al

Finally, to the extent that A can influence its

-A-

A2

AlblI A2bl

own performance by taking a particular action
(e.g., completing a task, stocking materials), it is

BI

described as having reflexive control (RC). From

3
-3

an interdependence theory perspective, any
interunit relationship can be described in terms

-B- Blal Bla2

of A's fate and behavior control over B, B's fate

Alb2 A2b2

and behavior control over A, and each unit's
own reflexive control.

B2

Like McCann and Ferry's (1979) approach, the
unit of analysis is the work unit, represented by

Fi al B2a2

a manager and subordinates. The assumption is
made that the outcomes of the work unit can be

Figure 1.- Example matrix.

represented as outcome levels assessed by a

488

-A-

B. The manager of A has two alternative actions,

Sales Manager

al or a2. The manager of B also has two alterna-

Al

tive actions, bl or b2. The matrix is divided into

A2

approve disapprove

four cells, each representing one of the four pos-

B1

sible action pairs (i.e., Al/Bl, Al/B2, A2/Bl,

Albl

A2bl

A2/B2). Each individual cell in the matrix is divided in half. Manager A's outcomes from a giv-

en pair of actions are represented in the top half

of each cell, and Manager B's outcomes are represented in the bottom half of each cell. Man-

-B-

i Blal \ Bla2 \

ager A's outcomes from the pair of actions Al/Bl
is represented in the area Albl. Manager B's

outcomes from the same pair of actions, Al/Bl,
is represented in the area Blal.
The numbers entered in the matrix represent

each manager's anticipated outcomes from each

action pair. The magnitude of each number re-

Figure 2. Example of fate and reflexive control.

presents the relative outcome level (comparison
level) for a given pair of actions, while the sign

manager does. From an interdependence theory

indicates the direction of the outcome. In Figure
1, Manager A's positive outcomes of 3 from the

perspective, A's outcomes from an action by B

pair of actions Al/B 1 is entered in the area A lb 1,

gives B fate control over A. Manager A's fate is

while Manager B's negative outcomes of 3 from

controlled by whatever choice B makes.

If the credit manager wishes to keep bad debts

the same pair of actions is entered in B la 1.

to a minimum, a negative outcome of, say, 4 could

An Example of Interdependence Theory

result from approving the order (action b 1) re-

A practical example is useful at this point. Con-

gardless of what the sales manager does. The

sider the possible outcomes for a credit manager

matrix in Figure 2 portrays the credit manager

and a sales manager from each other's actions

as unconditionally receiving a -4 in areas Blal

relative to an order from a new customer. The

and Bla2. This gives B reflexive control, since B

actions of the sales manager (Manager A) could

can provide positive outcomes by choosing B 1 or

be to approve (action a 1) or disapprove (action

can deny these outcomes by choosing B2. That

a2) the order. The credit manager (Manager B)

is, by his/her own action or reflex, B controls

also either could approve (action b 1) or disap-

his/her own outcomes.

prove (action b2) the order. If the new customer

As a third alternative, the credit manager

represents an unknown credit risk, an interde-

might receive positive outcomes from coordinat-

pendence matrix can be used to graphically re-

ing actions with the sales manager. For instance,

present each manager's outcomes from his or her

the credit manager might have assessed a posi-

own actions and the actions of the other man-

tive outcome of 2 for approving orders which the

ager. If the sales manager is rewarded based on

sales manager approves and for disapproving

sales volume, he or she would prefer that the

orders that the sales manager disapproves. The

credit manager approve the order. The matrix in

outcomes from similar actions is represented by

Figure 2 describes A as getting a positive out-

2 entered in areas Blal and B2a2 in Figure 3.

come of 5 for B choosing action b 1. This value

In this case, the outcomes received by the credit

appears in areas Albl and A2bl, because the

manager are contingent upon, but not deter-

outcome is not a condition of what the sales

mined by the actions of the sales manager. If the
489

-A-

-A-

Sales Manager

Sales Manager

Al

Al

A2

B1

Albi

0

Bi

A2bl

~~0

A2

approve disapprove

approve disapprove

Albl

A2bl

0

r

0

rCB

20

d

i

Blal

d

i Blal \ Bla2 \
-B- tAlb2 A2b2

Bla2

B- tAlb2 2b2
D.
r.

~0

0

2
(D

B2 3.E aml o1 B2a2

B2

B2al

B2a2

Figure 3. Example of behavior control.

Figure 4. Example of resultant matrix.

sales manager approves the sales, in order to

tween any two units can be described by an

get positive outcomes the credit manager also

index calculated from the components of the

must approve and vice versa. The contingent

matrix. The index of dependence (ID) is calcu-

relationship between actions and outcomes re-

lated as the sum of the squares of a unit's out-

presents the reciprocal nature of coordination re-

comes controlled by another unit's actions (FC),

quirements described by Thompson (1967). With-

and those outcomes contingent on the actions of

in the interdependence theory framework, the
comes on the pair's joint action gives A behavior

another unit (BC); divided by the sum of the
squares of all of a unit's outcomes (RC, BC, and
FC). The formula for the index of dependence for

control Qver B. That is, since A chooses al, this

Unit A is presented in Figure 5. As the amount of

makes bl preferable to B; by choosing a2, A
makes b2 preferable to B.
A final or resultant matrix can be developed

the amount of reflexive control, the index in-

contingent or reciprocal dependence of B's out-

fate and behavior control increases, relative to
creases from zero (completely independent) to

that represents all outcomes received by each
manager from each pair of possible actions (see

1.0 (completely dependent).

Figure 4). The resultant matrix contains the sumn

for the sales manager (A) is 1.0, indicating that

of all matrices that contain a particular type of

his or her actions are completely dependent on

In the above example the index of dependence

outcome (i.e., outcomes from one's own, other's,

those of the credit manager. In the example,

and jQint actions) for each manager. Assuming
a manager will seek to maximize possible outcomes, his/her chQice of action can be inferred

she/he was described as subject only to fate control by the credit manager. The index is . 33 (moderately independent) for the credit manager (B).
In the example, the credit manager is described

from this matrix.

as having strong reflexive control and being sub-

An Alternative Interdependence Construct

ject to relatively weaker behavior control by the
sales manager.
This construction of interdependence can be
used to represent Thompson's typology. The lack

Within this theoretical framework, the amount
of interunit interdependence is defined as the
extent to which a unit's outcomes are controlled

of interaction between units in pooled interde-

directly by or are contingent upon the actions of
another unit. The degree of interdependence be-

pendence can be represented as a matrix in
490

Applying the New Construct

(FCa2 + BCa2)
A's Dependence =

(RCa2 + BCa2 + FCa2)

Determinants of Interunit Conflict
Consider the credit and sales managers re-

Where:

RCa = A's reflexive control

viewing two orders-one from a reliable cus-

BCa = Behavior control over A

tomer, the other from a questionable customer.
In the case of the customer of questionable

FCa = Fate control over A

repute, the sales manager wants to approve the

Figure, 5. Formula for index of dependence.

order, but the credit manager wants to disapprove it. The sales manager wants the credit
manager to approve the order, and the credit
manager wants the sales manager to disapprove

which both units only have reflexive control. By

adding fate controls to that matrix, the direct and

it. The interdependence between the two man-

noncontingent effects of unit action which distin-

agers is represented as mcatrix X in Figure 6. In

guish serial interdependence can be repre-

matrix X both the sales manager (A) and the
credit manager (B) are subject to fate control (3)

sented. Finally, by adding behavior control, the
contingent effects which distinguish reciprocal

and have reflexive control (6). In this case, the

interdependence can be represented. Interde-

fate control and reflexive control are noncorre-

pendence theory can readily capture the "Gutt-

spondent. Each manager prefers that the other

man scale" quality of Thompson's typology. It

choose his or her own least preferred option. In

also offers an explicit metric for comparing lev-

this situation, there is a conflict between what

els of interdependence, which Thompson's typol-

each manager wants to do and what the other

ogy lacks.

wishes him or her to do.

The elements used by McCann and Ferry can

In the case of the reliable customer, both the

be incorporated as factors contributing to the

credit and sales manager want to approve the

magnitude of the utility of a given action. Fre-

order, and both would prefer that the other man-

quency, amount, and criticality of resources ex-

ager approve the order as well. The situation
can be represented by matrix Y in Figure 6. As

changed are arguably central determinants of
the importance of an action. Thus interdepen-

in matrix X, both Managers A and B also are

dence theory allows incorporation of the ideas of

subject to fate control (3) and have reflexive con-

Thompson and McCann and Ferry without their

trol (6). However, in this case, the fate control
and reflexive control are correspondent. Each

limitations.

It has been demonstrated then that interde-

manager prefers to do what the other wants the

pendence theory can describe different amounts

manager to do. Thus, in this situation there is no
conflict between the twQ managers, where there
was such conflict in the first case.

of interunit interdependence. In so doing, the

construct satisfies Lewin's first requirement. It
must, however, be demonstrated that the proposed interdependence construct can satisfy
Lewin's second requirement, that it can be differentiated from related constructs. One such re-

It is at this point that the inadequacy of the
current constructs becomes most apparent. Lewin

(1951, p. 37) stated that related constructs should
be derivable from distinct functions of common
elements. Only constructs so derivedl can be cdistinguished precisely from one another and their
effects compared. Both Thompson's, and McCann and Ferry's constructs fail to meet this
requirement. Neither the pattern of work flow

lated construct is interunit conflict. When labor
is divided, the structure of the consequent rela-

tions between units creates some potential for
interunit conflict (Jones, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Thompson, 1967).
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-ASales Manager

Al

approve
BI

Albl

C

A2

disapprove
Abl

~~~3

e

-ASales Manager

Al

approve

B

A2

disapprove

Albl

-3

A2b

Q9

3

0

B
1
3
3
d
6
e
i
!Bla
B1a2
i
Bi1C
Bl12
t

Alb2

A2b2

6

r<
B2

-3

B2

l

-B-

0

0

B2a

Matrix

t

r.

B2
X

Alb2

6

3

B2al

2

0

0

B2a2

Matrix

Y

Figure 6. Examples (respectively) of noncorrespondence (matrix X) and correspondence (matrix Y).
nor the volume of transactions can be used to

Using the above formula, the index of corre-

specify the amount of interunit conflict. Both

spondence for matrix X is -.8, and for matrix Y it

Thompson and McCann and Ferry assumed that

is + .8. In matrix X, the outcomes for the two man-

"the probability of conflict among positions or

agers are highly noncorrespondent, and conflict

groups is directly proportional to their degree

is likely, while in matrix Y the outcomes for the

of interdependence" (Thompson, 1967, p. 60).

two managers are highly correspondent and

While interdependence is a necessary condition
for conflict to occur, the above example demon-

such conflict is unlikely.

strates that interdependence is not a sufficient

correspondence are the ones used in calculat-

condition.

ing the index of dependence. Thus, the proposed

The elements used in calculating the index of

With the new construct, the level of interunit

constructs can be used to distinguish between

conflict created by the division of labor can be

the amount of interdependence and the amount

determined from the pattern of outcomes repre-

of conflict between units as Lewin prescribed.

sented in the matrix. The difference of interest

Interdependence theory offers a basis for re-

between two parties can be measured by the
index of correspondence developed by Kelley
and Thibaut (1978). The index distinguishes between relationships in which the differences between units' outcomes are great (high conflict of

conceptualizing and operationalizing interunit in-

interest) and relationships in which the sums of

pendence and conflict can be derived from com-

the outcomes for both units is great (high com-

mon conceptual elements.

terdependence in a way that satisfies both of
Lewin's conditions: (a) The constructs can be used
to compare instances of interdependence across

settings, and (b) the related constructs of interde-

monality of interest). The index of correspondence

A final requirement of such conceptualizations,

(IC) can be calculated for each matrix using the

imposed by an applied discipline like organiza-

formula presented in Figure 7. Matrices become

tion theory, is that constructs are demonstrably

increasingly noncorrespondent as the index

useful in framing and investigating questions,

value moves from 0 to -1, and increasingly corre-

"the answers to which matter" (J. S. Adams, per-

spondent as the index moves from 0 to + 1.

sonal communication, 1982). In recognition of this

492

2 (RCa * FCb + RCb * FCa + BCb * BCa)
Correspondence

(RCa2 + RCb2 + FCa2 + FCb2 + BCa 2 + BCb2)
Where:

RCa = A's reflexive control
BCa = Behavior control over A
FCa = Fate control over A
RCb = B's reflexive control

BCb = Behavior control over B
FCb = Fate control over B

Figure 7. Computational formula for index of correspondence.

requirement, the constructs derived above are
applied here to a question posed by Thompson
(1967, p. 57): What determines the effectiveness

tingency represents increasing ambiguity and

of particular coordination strategies?

dependence is described as affecting the fre-

uncertainty in the coordination process (Jones,

1984). The degree of contingency posed by interquency and volume of communication and deci-

Determinants of Effective Coordination

sion making between units.

Strategies

With pooled interdependence, action can proceed
without regard to action in other positions ....
With sequential interdependence, however, each
position in the set must be readjusted if any one of

Organizations employ a variety of coordination or integration strategies to manage relations

between units (e.g., rules, plans, lateral relations,
bargaining, rewards, and job designs). McCann

them acts improperly .... With reciprocal inter-

tion strategies vary along three dimensions:

dependence . . . the actions of each position in
the set must be adjusted to the actions of one or
more others in the set (Thompson, 1967, p. 58).

formality, cooperativeness, and localization.

In response to the sheer volume of coordination

and Galbraith (1981) suggested that coordina-

Informal, decentralized, and cooperative strate-

requirements, Thompson recommended increas-

gies can be characterized as lateral or organic,

ingly lateral, organic coordination strategies. As

while formal, centralized, and controlling strategies can be characterized as vertical or mecha-

ganizations seek to localize interaction and con-

the amount of interdependence increases, "or-

nistic (Burns & Stalker, 1961).

fine it to conditionally autonomous groups-to

Interdependence and Coordination. Thomp-

cluster positions and groups into the smallest pos-

son (1967) proposed that pooled, serial, and re-

sible inclusive units in order to minimize coordi-

ciprocal interdependence would be increasingly

nation costs" (Thompson, 1967, p. 60).

difficult to coordinate. He argued that a preferred

In general, empirical research supports Thomp-

mode of coordination should be associated with

son's propositions. For example, the Aston stud-

each type of interdependence. Using the terminology of McCann and Galbraith (1981) Thomp-

ies indicated that work flow interdependence was

son predicted that under norms of rationality,
increasing interdependence should be coordinated by increasingly informal, localized, and
cooperative strategies.
Thompson described increasing amounts of interdependence as posing increasing degrees of
contingency to interdependent units. Such con-

and negatively related to the degree of formal-

positively related to the localization of authority

ization (Aldrich, 1972; Child, 1973, HIickson, Pugh,
& Pheysey, 1969). In contrast, Mohr (1971) found
no relationship between interdependence and
participativeness of supervision. Hrebiniak (1974),
using Mohr's measure, found a significant positive relationship between interdependence and
493

participativeness in decision making, and significant negative relationships between interde-

ated with an increased preference for third party
intervention (Rubin, 1980). This association may

pendence and both the use of rules and the close-

be due to interdependent parties recognizing
that, in the face of increasing conflict of interest,
they may not be able to settle their differences

ness of supervision. Lynch (1974) also found that
interdependence was positively related to the

on their own (Rubin, 1980). Thus, increasing
amounts of interdependence may be associated

number of rules used in a unit.

Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig (1976) found

that amount of interdependence was positively
associated with the use of lateral coordination
strategies such as horizontal communication

with increasingly lateral or organic strategies.
Increasing amounts of conflict may require quite
distinct responses. Therefore, it is further speci-

channels and unscheduled meetings. Amount

fied that:

of interdependence was found to be negatively
related to the use of vertical coordination strategies such as rules, plans, and vertical communi-

Hypothesis 2: Increases in the noncorrespondence
of outcomes created by the division
of labor will be associated with the
selection and effectiveness of increasingly vertical or mechanistic
coordination strategies.

cation channels.

Consistent with Thompson then, it is hypothesized that:

The joint effects of the division of labor on coordination strategy predicted in Hypotheses 1 and
2 are displayed in Figure 8. In contrast with the
traditional unidimensional continuum used to describe the distinction between mechanistic and
organic strategies, the dimensions are conceptuConflict and Coordination. The amount of interalized as independent variables which together
unit conflict also has been proposed as a deterdescribe particular types of coordination stratminate of the effectiveness of a coordination strategies. In Figure 8, along the X axis is a continegy. Organizations may use rules and guideuum representing a progression from low levels
lines to manage low levels of interunit conflict.
to high levels of contingency management stratAccording to March and Simon (1958), managegies. Along this continuum, Thompson's predicers faced with interunit conflict prefer unilateral
tions fall. When the amount of interdependence
(e.g., rules, programs) rather than multilateral
is low, there is little contingency to be coorditechniques (e.g., bargaining or confrontation) to
nated between units. Therefore, a minimal strategy is appropriate, such as "devising rules which
resolve the conflict. As the amount of conflipt
increases, managers need to use mediated conapply to certain processes or categories of activfrontation to help resolve disagreements between
ity whenever and wherever these occur in the
units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Nielson, 1972).
organization" (Thompson, 1967, p. 61). As the
At high levels of interunit conflict, organizations
amount of interdependence increases, the amount
need to use even more assertive hierarchical or
of contingency to be managed increases. This
forcing methods to manage the relations between
culminates in the constant mutual adjustment
units. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted that in
between what Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig
the face of pure conflict "the usefulness of open(1976) called teams.
ness and confrontation is probably severely
Along the Y axis is a continuum representing
limited" (p. 205).
a progression from low to high levels of conflict
These propositions are consistent with the findmanagement strategies. Along this axis, the preings and theory on bargaining in organizations.
dicted responses to noncorrespondence of outIn laboratory studies of bargaining dyads, incomes fall. As the amount of noncorrespondence
creasing degrees of conflict have been associincreases, conflict resolution requirements inHypothesis 1: Increases in the amount of interdependence created by the division
of labor should be associated with
the selection and effectiveness of
increasingly lateral, organic coordination strategies.
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High

C) Chain of
1) | : Command

Matrix

CD)

o.w

Low

High

Contingency Management Strategy

Amount of Interdependence

Figure 8. Model of coordination strategy selection and effectiveness.

crease. To resolve increasing amounts of conflict,
more and more formalization, centralization, and
control are needed. This continuum culminates

Implications
By employing the structural framework of interdependence theory, future studies can define

in centralized, hierarchical coordinating strategies. Therefore, the optimal coordination strat-

more explicitly the possible determinants of the
effectiveness of coordination strategy. However,
one critical problem to be resolved is estimating
the structural components of interdependence in

egy is described as an admixture of both contin-

gency and conflict management elements, each
in response to a concomitant characteristic of
the division of labor.

the field. Although researchers of bargaining and
other game theoretic applications of interdependence theory have manipulated component utilities in the laboratory, little field estimation of such
utilities has been done.

The model in Figure 8 permits predictions regarding the selection and effectiveness of hybrid
coordination strategies such as the matrix structure (Davis & Lawrence, 1977; Galbraith, 1973).
Davis and Lawrence (1977) described the matrix
as organic structures such as teams overlaid onto
a mechanistic structure. They predicted that the
matrix would be most effective when both requirements for contingency management are
high and when the requirements for conflict resolution are high (due to the need to maintain a
dual focus and to distribute scarce resources).

One of the critical measurement issues is
whether to estimate the constructs directly or to
estimate the components first, and then calculate the indices. In studies of personal relationships, researchers have explored both strategies.
For example, Walster, Walster, and Traupman
(1978) calculated a net profit or correspondence
of interdependence from self-reports of hetero-
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sexual dyads. In a series of investigations of the

analyzing the concomitant effects of interdepend-

structure of personal relationships, Kelley (1979)

ence and interunit conflict. This framework also

collected self-reports of component values from

can be applied to investigating other conse-

dyads in which a specific decision was made

quences of the division of labor. For example,

(e.g., choosing a movie to attend, cleaning an

the relative power between units in terms of magnitudes and asymmetries of dependence can be

apartment).

While the studies of personal relationships

calculated from the matrix structure, and the prop-

have yielded useful data from field settings, an

ositions of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer

organizational setting has yielded mixed results.
In a study of power and conflict between automo-

resource dependence theory proposes that coali-

bile dealers and distributors, Anderson and

tions (e.g., work units) attempt to change their

& Salancik, 1978) can be modeled. In general,

Narus (1984) constructed interdependence matri-

relationship with the environment by either de-

ces representing major marketing decisions from

creasing their dependence on others or increas-

self-reports of component values; serious reliabil-

ing others' dependence on them (Ulrich & Bar-

ity and validity problems with their data were

ney, 1984). Both of these objectives can be mod-

reported. To date, there are no examples of stud-

eled as changes in either the magnitude or sym-

ies that directly measure the construct indices in

metry of interdependence (again employing the

organizations.

basic conceptual elements described above).

Much of the challenge to successfully apply-

Further, structural bases of power can be iso-

ing interdependence theory in organizations lies

lated to distinguish between exchange depen-

in measurement issues, yet objective sources of

dence (relative dependence on others' actions)

data on component utilities, and reliable and

and coordination dependence (relative depen-

valid methods of component estimation from self-

dence on joint actions). Thus, beyond the spe-

reports need to be developed. Nevertheless, con-

cific advantages of a more robust interdepend-

structs derived from interdependence theory do

ence construct, the major implication of the

not pose very different measurement problems

argument presented here is the utility of interde-

than other constructs, while they do offer distinct

pendence theory as a framework for studying

theoretical advantages.

organizations.

Further Advantages
The advantages of this application of interdependence theory extend beyond its facility for
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